Commune: Shared Ownership in an Agnostic Cloud by Soriente, Claudio et al.
Commune: Shared Ownership in an Agnostic Cloud
Claudio Soriente
ETH Zurich
Ghassan Karame
NEC Laboratories Europe
Hubert Ritzdorf
ETH Zurich
Srdjan Marinovic
ETH Zurich
Srdjan Cˇapkun
ETH Zurich
Abstract—Although cloud storage platforms promise a conve-
nient way for users to share files and engage in collaborations,
they require all files to have a single owner who unilaterally
makes access control decisions. Existing clouds are, thus, agnostic
to shared ownership. This can be a significant limitation in many
collaborations because one owner can, for example, delete files
and revoke access without consulting the other collaborators.
In this paper, we first formally define a notion of shared
ownership within a file access control model. We then propose
a solution, called Commune, to the problem of distributively
enforcing shared ownership in agnostic clouds, so that access
grants require the support of a pre-arranged threshold of owners.
Commune can be used in existing clouds without requiring any
modifications to the platforms. We analyze the security of our
solution and evaluate its scalability and performance by means
of an implementation integrated with Amazon S3.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even though the cloud promises a convenient way for
users to share files and effortlessly engage in collaborations,
it still retains the notion of individual file ownership. That
is, each file stored in the cloud is owned by a single user,
who can unilaterally decide whether to grant or deny any
access request to that file. However, the individual ownership
is not suitable for numerous cloud-based applications and
collaborations. Consider a scenario where a number of research
organizations and industrial partners want to set up a shared
repository in the cloud to collaborate on a joint research
project. If all participants contribute their research efforts to
the project, then they may want to share the ownership over the
collaboration files so that all access decisions are agreed upon
among the owners. There are two main arguments why this
may be preferred to individual ownership. First, if there is a
sole owner, then he can abuse his rights by unilaterally making
access control decisions. The community features a number of
anecdotes where malicious users revoke access to shared files
from other collaborators. This problem is further exacerbated
by users increasingly storing most of their data in the cloud
without keeping local copies, and accessing them through
portable devices that have limited storage capacity. Second,
even if owners are willing to elect and trust one of them to
make access control decisions, the elected owner may not want
to be held accountable for collecting and correctly evaluating
other owners’ policies. For example, incorrect evaluations may
incur negative reputation or financial penalties.
In contrast to individual ownership, we introduce a novel
notion of shared ownership where n users jointly own a file
and each file access request must be granted by a pre-arranged
threshold of t owners. We remark that existing cloud platforms,
such as Amazon S3 and Dropbox, provide no support for
shared ownership policies, and offer only basic access control
lists. In short, they are agnostic to the concept of shared
ownership. Furthermore, state-of-the-art trust management sys-
tems that can support shared ownership policies (e.g., SecPAL
[7], KeyNote [10], Delegation Logic [19]) make all access
decisions using a centralized Policy Decision Point (PDP).
This is not suitable for enforcing our shared ownership model,
because the user who administrates the PDP can arbitrarily
change the policy rules set by the owners and enforce his own
policies.
In this paper, we address the problem of distributed en-
forcement of shared ownership within an agnostic cloud. By
distributed enforcement, we mean enforcement where access
to files in a shared repository is granted if and only if t
out of n owners separately support the grant decision. To
tackle this problem, we first introduce the Shared-Ownership
file access control Model (SOM) to define our notion of
shared ownership, and to formally state the given enforcement
problem. We then propose our solution, called Commune, that
enforces shared ownership policies in a distributed fashion.
Additionally, Commune can be used within a third-party
cloud without any modifications to the platform. It only
requires that the cloud offers basic access control lists, as
is the case with current platforms. We integrate a prototype
implementation of Commune within Amazon S3 [1] and we
show that its performance scales well with the file size and
with the number of users. To the best of our knowledge,
Commune is the first solution to distributed enforcement of
shared ownership in an agnostic cloud.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We formalize the notion of shared ownership within
a file access control model named SOM, and use it
to define a novel access control problem of distributed
enforcement of shared ownership in an agnostic cloud.
• We propose a solution, called Commune, which
distributively enforces SOM and can be deployed in
an agnostic cloud platform. Commune ensures that
(i) a user cannot read a file from a shared repository
unless that user has collected at least t grants from t
distinct owners, and (ii) a user cannot write a file in
a shared repository unless that user is granted write
access by t of the file owners.
• We build a prototype of Commune and evaluate it
within Amazon S3. We show that our solution scales
well with the file size and the number of users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we introduce our notion of shared ownership in
a file access control model. In Section III, we detail our
solution, Commune, that enables the distributed enforcement
of shared ownership in the cloud, and we analyze its security.
In Section IV, we evaluate the performance of Commune
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through an implementation within Amazon S3. In Section V,
we discuss further insights with respect to our proposals. In
Section VI, we review the related work, and we conclude the
paper in Section VII.
II. SOM: SHARED-OWNERSHIP FILE
ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
In this section, we first formalize our notion of Shared
Ownership within a file access control Model named SOM. We
then discuss the main shortcoming of centralized enforcement,
and we define the problem of SOM’s distributed enforcement.
A. Syntax and Semantics
For simplicity, we do not consider directories (or other
file groupings) in SOM. A file is created with the following
request:
U reqs Create(F, t,O)
Upon receiving this request, SOM creates a file F, assigns
a user U and all the users in O as F’s owners, and sets the
file’s threshold to t. SOM grants requests for file creation to
authenticated users if the new file name is unique.
To access a file, a user submits a request with an action he
wishes to perform on the file:
U reqs Action(F)
SOM does not instantiate concrete file actions, as these are
left to the concrete implementations, and we use Action(F)
to denote a generic file access action on a file F.
If an owner O wishes to grant an action to U over F, then
he issues a credential of the form:
O says U can Action(F)
Intuitively, a credential is a certificate by an owner to support
an action for a user. Figure 1 presents the full credential and
request grammar.
File access requests are granted if and only if t out of n
owners issue the corresponding credentials. For example, if the
threshold for F is 2, then U can perform Action on F if the
following credentials are present:
O says U can Action(F)
O′ says U can Action(F)
where O and O′ are two of F’s owners.
The SOM access control policy, ΠSOM, is a mapping from
the set of all requests R and the set of all credentials C into
the {grant, deny} decision set, such that the file threshold is
always respected. Formally:
Definition 1 (Shared Ownership Access Control Policy):
The SOM access control policy, denoted ΠSOM, is a mapping
R× C → {grant, deny} such that:
ΠSOM(U reqs Action(F), Creds) 7→ grant iff
{(O1 says U can Action(F)),
. . . , (Ot says U can Action(F))} ⊆ Creds,
O1 6= · · · 6= Ot and
O1 ∈ O, . . . , Ot ∈ O,
credential ::= u says u can Action(f)
request ::= u reqs (Create(f, t, o) | Action(f))
u ::= String
t ::= N
f ::= String
o ::= Set of Strings
Fig. 1. SOM’s credential and request grammar.
where t is F’s threshold, and O is the set of F’s owners.
We say that SOM grants a file access to a given request r and
its accompanying credentials C if and only if ΠSOM(r, C) =
grant.
Note that by Definition 1, SOM treats owners only as
sources of credentials, and does not implicitly grant them any
additional access rights.
B. Centralized vs. Distributed Enforcement
Existing credential-based access control systems have the
following enforcement model. A Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) has one designated Policy Decision Point (PDP), which
collects all the required credentials and evaluates an access
control policy (such as ΠSOM) for a given request. The PDP
has one user who can administrate its access control policy. We
refer to this enforcement model as centralized since a single
policy decision point grants all access requests. Note that even
if a PEP used multiple PDP components (managed by different
users), it would still require an additional PDP to centrally
decide how these decisions are combined. In Appendix A, we
show how SOM can be centrally enforced. We do this by
specifying the SOM access control policy as a Datalog logic
program. A Datalog interpreter can then act as the PDP. Using
Datalog interpreters as PDPs is also common in state-of-the-art
access control systems (e.g., [7], [19]).
The key shortcoming of centralized enforcement is that the
PDP’s access decision is solely sufficient for granting access
requests. The administrator, responsible for managing the rules
stored at the PDP, can therefore change the policy rules to
grant requests that lack the necessary credentials. In practice,
this means that the shared ownership policy agreed upon by
the owners can always be bypassed, and thus the notion of
shared ownership nullified. The natural question to consider is
how to enforce the SOM policy so that the agreed thresholds
cannot be bypassed. We refer to such an enforcement solution
as distributed because it must grant access if and only if t
owners separately support the grant decision.
When considering a cloud as a collaboration platform,
this enforcement issue is even more difficult because a cloud
platform does not allow deployment of additional enforcement
components. A cloud platform only supports basic access
control policies via Access Control Lists (ACLs). We frame
these concerns as the SOM distributed enforcement problem.
Problem Statement: How can the SOM access control policy
be distributively enforced within a cloud platform that supports
only ACL-based PDPs?
We summarize the state-of-the-art with respect to this
problem in Table I.
III. COMMUNE: DISTRIBUTED ENFORCEMENT OF
SHARED OWNERSHIP
This section presents Commune, a solution for distributed
enforcement of the SOM access control policy. As SOM
does not specify concrete file access operations, we instantiate
Commune with write and read actions. Before introducing
our solution, we outline our cloud and attacker model.
A. Cloud and Attacker Model
We focus on a cloud storage platform, S, where a set of
users U have personal accounts onto which they upload files.
We assume that each user authenticates himself to S before
downloading/uploading content. A user U ∈ U can unilaterally
decide who has access to files stored on his account. In
particular, S allows each user to define access control policies
of the type p : U × {write, read} → {grant, deny}. We
also assume that S correctly enforces individual access control
policies. This model reflects the functionalities provided by
existing cloud platforms, such as Amazon S3 [1].
Since we assume that S authenticates users, we only focus
on internal adversaries. An adversary may try to gain read
access to a file even if fewer than t owners have issued for her
the corresponding credentials. We refer to this adversary as a
“malicious reader”. Alternatively, an adversary, who has been
granted write access by fewer than t owners, may write a file F
and then try to publish F as if F were written by a writer who
has been granted write access by at least t owners. We refer to
this adversary as a “malicious writer”. We also consider sets
of users who collude to escalate their access rights.
We remark that, as is common for access control systems,
we cannot prevent a user who rightfully reads a file, from
storing a copy to be read at a later time, even if his read
rights have been revoked.
B. Overview of Commune
We begin with the following observations:
Observation 1: Commune’s files cannot be stored on a
single user account.
Following the discussion of centralized enforcement, no single
user account can be charged with making unilateral grant and
deny decisions. Otherwise, a user may abuse his rights and take
unilateral access control decisions. A straightforward solution
where a file is encrypted (e.g., using a key shared among the
owners) and the ciphertext is stored on a single account, allows
that account holder to, for example, unilaterally deny read
access to the ciphertext. If the ciphertext cannot be read, any
mechanism to distribute or recover the encryption key is of no
help. We argue, therefore, that Commune cannot use a central
repository because its administrator may unilaterally grant or
deny access to the files stored therein. Our alternative is to use
a “shared repository”, which is an abstraction built on top of
the owners’ personal accounts on S.
Enforcement/Ownership Individual Shared
Centralized ACLs Datalog-based Systems
Distributed — Commune
TABLE I. SOLUTIONS FOR ENFORCING INDIVIDUAL AND SHARED
OWNERSHIP WITHIN A CLOUD. NOTE THAT DATALOG-BASED SYSTEMS
REQUIRE MODIFICATIONS TO THE CLOUD PLATFORM.
Observation 2: Commune cannot support in-place writ-
ing.
If Commune were to allow in-place writing, then users who
are granted write access could overwrite a file with “garbage”.
This would equate to granting users the right to make unilateral
decisions to delete the file, thus nullifying our efforts to prevent
such scenarios. A standard alternative to in-place writing is to
introduce “copy-on-write” mechanisms whereby a new file is
created upon each file write operation. To optimize perfor-
mance, Commune implements versioning and splits files into
units (i.e., the unit of granularity of versioning) so that writing
a new version of an existing file, only requires updating the
units that have changed with respect to the previous version.
Observation 3: Commune cannot prevent users from dis-
seminating a file through an out-of-band channel.
Access control solutions cannot prevent a user from distribut-
ing content through an out-of-band channel. For example, a
user who rightfully reads a file can leak it to third parties.
Similarly, a malicious writer can write a file and disseminate
it through an out-of-band channel. For example, a user can
publish files on his account on S and make them available for
others to read. We cannot prevent such behaviour. Commune,
however, must at least allow honest readers, who abide to
the protocol specification, to distinguish between the content
written by malicious writers and the content written by honest
writers.
Given these observations, Commune unfolds as follows.
At the system setup, users define the set of n owners O and
the threshold t.1 Commune abstracts the storage space of
the owner’s accounts on S as the “shared repository”. Each
owner grants/denies read and write access on his account
to users (including other owners) according to his individual
access control policy. The distributed enforcement of the SOM
access control policy then follows from the enforcement of the
individual access policies set by each owner.
To write a file to the shared repository, the writer encodes
the file in tokens and distributes the tokens to the owners’
accounts. A file is written to the shared repository if and only if
the writer successfully distributes the file’s tokens onto at least
t owners’ accounts. That is, a user has write access granted to
the shared repository if and only if he has write access granted
to at least t of the owners’ accounts. We refer to such a user
as an “authorized writer”.
To read a file from the shared repository, the reader must
fetch the file’s tokens from at least t distinct owners’ accounts.
Therefore, a user has read access granted to the file if and only
1Mechanisms to select the set of owners and the threshold t are outside
of our scope. In settings like scientific collaboration scenarios, owners and
thresholds are agreed by the partners.
if he has read access granted to the file’s tokens by at least t
owners. We refer to such a user as an “authorized reader”.
To secure access control enforcement, Commune is de-
signed to fulfil the following properties.
• Property 1: A malicious writer (i.e., a user who has
not been granted write access to the shared repository
by at least t owners), must not be able to write F and
distribute it as if F were authored by an authorized
writer.
• Property 2: A malicious reader (i.e., a user who has
not been granted read access to F by at least t own-
ers), must not be able to recover the file contents. This
property must also hold in case of revocation. That is,
the user must not be able to recover meaningful bits of
the file even if he previously had read access to F, and
his access rights were later revoked.2 Commune must
also provide collusion resistance. That is, coalitions of
users—where no single user is an authorized reader—
must not be able to pool their credentials to escalate
their read access rights.
Property 1 ensures protection against malicious writers who
try to disseminate content despite lacking the required creden-
tials. Property 2 guarantees that malicious readers cannot read
content written to the shared repository.
Commune fulfils Property 1 by design, through the ab-
straction of a shared repository and the copy-on-write mech-
anism (see Section III-E). Property 2 is fulfilled through two
cryptographic building blocks: Secure File Dispersal (SFD),
and Collusion Resistant Secret Sharing (CRSS). SFD ensures
that malicious readers cannot acquire any information about a
file, even if they had previously access to the file and were later
revoked. CRSS builds atop SFD and ensures that coalitions of
users where no single user has enough credentials to read the
file, cannot pool their credentials in order to escalate their read
access rights.
In the following, we describe and analyze SFD (Sec-
tion III-C) and CRSS (Section III-D); in Section III-E, we
detail the integration of both building blocks in Commune.
C. Secure File Dispersal (SFD)
Information dispersal algorithms [21] encode a file in n
chunks so that any t chunks (where t ≤ n) are sufficient to
decode it. However, information dispersal algorithms do not
provide any security guarantees if the number of available
chunks is less than t: any party with less than t chunks may
still recover meaningful information about the original file’s
content. This violates Property 2.
Previous work on securing information dispersal algo-
rithms [22] combines erasure codes with All-Or-Nothing
Transformations (AONT) [23]. The latter is an efficient block-
wise transformation that maps an n-block bitstring in input
to an n′-block bitstring in output (with n′ ≥ n). AONTs are
designed in such a way that, unless all the n′ output blocks
are available, it is hard to recover any of the input blocks.
2Note that once a user has had access to a file, then he can locally store
its copy. Similar to any other access control scheme, Commune cannot deter
this behavior.
Existing AONTs (e.g., [11], [23]) leverage block ciphers
and rely on the secrecy of a cryptographic key that is embedded
within the output blocks. Given all AONT output blocks, the
key can be recovered; once the key is known, individual blocks
can be reverted, independently of other blocks. Therefore,
current AONTs preserve their all-or-nothing property only for
one time: knowledge of the key allows recovery of parts of the
original data even if some of the output blocks are missing.
This is at odds with our security requirements. As argued, we
cannot prevent users from caching a local copy of the file and
reading it at later time when their read rights may have been
revoked. However, we still want to provide revocation of a
user who only stored the encryption key at the time when he
had read access to the file.
We therefore introduce a new scheme, called Secure File
Dispersal (SFD), that combines information dispersal algo-
rithms with an AONT scheme that preserves its all-or-nothing
property even if the adversary has the encryption key.
Definition
An SFD scheme consists of the following algorithms:
{c1, . . . , cn} ← SFD.Encode(t, n,F,K, λ).
Encodes a file F into n chunks, such that F can be
correctly decoded using any t chunks; K denotes
a key used in the encoding process and λ is a
security parameter.
F′ ← SFD.Decode(K, C, λ).
Takes as input a key K, a set of chunks C, and
security parameter λ; it outputs a file F′.
Correctness
Given {c1, . . . , cn} ← SFD.Encode(t, n,F,K, λ), we
require that if C ⊆ {c1, . . . , cn} and |C| ≥ t, then
F← SFD.Decode(K, C, λ).
Security
We define the advantage of adversary A as follows:
AdvSFD(A) = Pr[A(K, C)=f | K←{0, 1}l, l≥λ,F≡f1,. . .
,fm←{0, 1}mλ, {c1,. . . ,cn}←SFD.Encode(t, n,F,K, λ),
C ⊂ {c1,. . . ,cn}, |C|<t, f⊆F, |f |≥λ].
where f ⊆ F refers to a substring of F. We say that SFD is
secure if, for any p.p.t. adversary, its advantage is negligible
in the security parameter, i.e., AdvSFD(A) ≤ negl(λ).
The above definition captures the scenario where the ad-
versary is given access to enough chunks to decode F, and
later her access rights are revoked. Even though the adversary
might have locally stored the secret key K, we require the
probability of A to recover any λ consecutive bits of F to be
negligible in the security parameter, given less than t output
chunks.
Instantiation
Our SFD scheme combines information dispersal tech-
niques with an all-or-nothing transformation inspired by Fast
Fourier Transform.
Let E : {0, 1}4λ → {0, 1}2λ be a semantically secure block
cipher (e.g., E(·) could correspond to 256-bit Rijndael [15],
Fig. 2. Sketch of the AON-FFT scheme. We depict the case where the
input of AON-FFT consists of m = 8 input blocks. Solid circles refer to
the block cipher E(·), while empty circles depict its input/output blocks.
with λ = 128).3 The all-or-nothing transformation that SFD
uses, and that we call AON-FFT, takes as input a symmetric
key K (of size 2λ) and m input blocks f1, . . . , fm (each of size
λ). It executes in log2m rounds and, at each round, applies
E(·) to pairs of blocks. Each round is fed with the output of
the previous round. Therefore, the original input f1, . . . , fm is
treated as the output of round 0; similarly, the final output of
the algorithm is the output of round log2m (cf. Figure 2). The
pseudo-code of AON-FFT is shown in Algorithm 1. We omit
the details of the decryption algorithm since it is specular to
encryption.
Given the pseudo-code of AON-FFT, our SFD scheme
unfolds as follows:
c1, . . . , cn ← SFD.Encode(t, n,F,K, λ).
Parse F as f1, . . . , fm where each fi has size
λ. Run f¯1 . . . , f¯m ← AON-FFT(K, f1, . . . , fm).
Use the information dispersal encoder to encode
f¯1 . . . , f¯m in n chunks with reconstruction thresh-
old t.4
F′ ← SFD.Decode(K, C, λ).
Given C, set of at least t chunks, and key K,
use the information dispersal decoder to decode
blocks f¯ ′1, . . . , f¯ ′m.
Run f ′1 . . . , f
′
m ← AON-FFT(K, f¯ ′1, . . . , f¯ ′m).
Correctness
If {c1, . . . , cn} ← SFD.Encode(t, n,F,K, λ), any sub-
set of at least t chunks {ci1 , . . . , cit} can be decoded into
the whole output of AON-FFT, namely f¯1 . . . , f¯m. Given
K, the output of AON-FFT can be decrypted to recover
F = f1, . . . , fm.
Security
Given the construction of our AON-FFT scheme, it is easy
to see that each input block depends on all output blocks and
on the encryption key. Furthermore, assuming that E(·) is a
semantically secure block cipher, for any p.p.t. algorithm A,
we have AdvSFD(A) ≤ negl(λ). Refer to Appendix B for a
security argument.
Note that a construct similar to AON-FFT, was first
mentioned by Rivest [23] and later on used as a “proof
3The key size is 2λ and the input/output size is also 2λ, totalling 4λ size
of input.
4SFD can leverage any information dispersal algorithm (e.g., Reed-Solomon
codes [27]).
Algorithm 1 AON-FFT(K, f1, . . . , fm)
1: Parse f1, . . . , fm as f01 , . . . , f
0
m
2: for r ← 1 to log2m do . round counter
3: for i← 0 to m2r − 1 do
4: for j ← 1 to 2r−1 do
5: frj+i·2r ||frj+i·2r+2r−1 ← E(K, fr−1j+i·2r , fr−1j+i·2r+2r−1)
6: end for
7: end for
8: end for
9: return fr1 . . . , frm as f¯1 . . . , f¯m
of storage” in [26]. Nevertheless, ours is the first detailed
FFT-inspired all-or-nothing transformation. While AON-FFT
looks similar to [26], the construction proposed therein can
use any pseudo-random permutation in the FFT network.
Our AON-FFT requires a keyed-permutation, hence a block-
cipher. Furthermore, the goal of the adversary in [26] is to
recover, in a given amount of time, all output blocks. In
contrast, the goal of our adversary is to recover any input block
even if he is not entitled to access the file. This entails different
security definition and analysis.
D. Collusion Resistant Secret Sharing (CRSS)
We now introduce our second building block, called Col-
lusion Resistant Secret Sharing (CRSS). Similar to secret-
sharing, CRSS enables distributing a message among a set
of designated shareholders, so that any subset of shareholders
of size equal to or greater than the threshold can reconstruct
the secret. CRSS, furthermore, allows users to collect “dele-
gations” by shareholders to reconstruct the message. If a user
collects enough (i.e., above the threshold) delegations, he can
rightfully reconstruct the message. However, users cannot pool
their delegations to reconstruct the message, unless one of them
has collected enough delegations. In Commune, CRSS is used
to secret-share the key K used in SFD, in order to achieve
collusion resistance.
CRSS is inspired by decentralized Attribute Based Encryp-
tion (ABE) [18] where shares of a secret are blinded with
shares of 0, such that, if a user collects enough shares for
his identity, the blinding cancels out and the secret can be
reconstructed.
Definition
Our definition of CRSS builds on top of a standard thresh-
old secret-sharing scheme SS with algorithms SS.Share and
SS.Combine(·), to share and reconstruct a secret, respectively.
We assume SS to be secure according to the Game Priv
definition by Rogaway et al. [24]. That is, we assume that
an adversary has only negligible advantage in identifying
which out of two values was (t, n) secret-shared using the
SS.Share(·) algorithm, even if the adversary can corrupt up to
t− 1 shareholders and access their shares.
CRSS defines the following algorithms:
{s1, . . . , sn} ← CRSS.Share(s, t, n).
Shares secret s in a set of n shares {s1, . . . , sn}
with reconstruction threshold t.
di,j ← CRSS.Delegate(si, Uj).
Takes as input a share si and an user identity Uj .
The output is a delegation di,j .
s′ ← CRSS.Combine({di1,j , . . . , dil,j}).
Combines delegations {di1,j , . . . , dil,j} into s′.
Correctness
Given {s1, . . . , sn} ← CRSS.Share(s, t, n), then
s← CRSS.Combine({di1,j , . . . , dil,j}) if
dip,j ← CRSS.Delegate(sip , Uj) for 1 ≤ p ≤ l and l ≥ t.
Security
We model the security of CRSS using an adaptation of
the Game Priv of [24] and we denote the refined game by
Game Priv∗:
Init. The adversary A submits two messages
x0, x1 of equal length. The challenger flips
an unbiased coin b and runs {s1, . . . , sn} ←
CRSS.Share(xb, t, n).
Find. A can submit two types of queries. In
Type-1 queries, the adversary can corrupt up to
t′ ≤ t− 1 shareholders and receives their shares.
At this time, A picks t′ indexes i1, . . . , it′ and
receives {si1 , . . . , sit′}. In Type-2 queries, for any
fresh identity Uj , the adversary can ask for up to
t′′ delegations, as long as t′ + t′′ ≤ t − 1. A
submits an identity Uj and t′′ indexes i1, . . . , it′′ ,
and receives delegations {di1,j , . . . , dit′′ ,j}.
Guess. The adversary outputs her guess b′ and
wins if b′ = b.
We define the advantage of the adversary as the proba-
bility of its winning minus a half; that is, AdvPriv
∗
CRSS(A) =
Prob[Priv*
A] − 12 . Therefore, we say that CRSS is secure
if any p.p.t. algorithm A has only negligible advantage in
winning Game Priv*.
The above Game Priv* models a scenario where a set
of malicious users, including up to t′ shareholders, collect up
to t′′ delegations for each of their identities. If t′+ t′′ ≥ t, the
malicious shareholders can produce the missing delegations
for any of the colluding user identities, so that the secret can
be reconstructed by means of CRSS.Combine(·). Otherwise,
colluding users must not be able to retrieve the secret.
Instantiation
Our CRSS scheme is based on the threshold secret-sharing
scheme proposed in [13], which is defined as follows:
gx, {x1, . . . , xn} ← SS.Share(−, t, n).
Pick a cyclic group G of prime order q where the
discrete logarithm assumption holds; let 〈g〉 = G.
Pick a random x ∈ Zq and set the secret to gx.
Pick a random t − 1-degree polynomial X with
coefficients in Zq , such that X(0) = x. Set the
i-th share to xi = X(i).
s′ ← SS.Combine({xi1 , . . . , xil}).
Given shares {xi1 , . . . , xil}, use polynomial inter-
polation to recover the secret. That is:
s′ = g
∑p=l
p=1 xipλp
where λp =
∏k 6=p
1≤k≤l
xik
xik−xip
.
Note that in the above scheme, the secret is not given
as input to the Share algorithm; rather, it is set to gx for
a randomly chosen x. Given the above algorithms, our CRSS
scheme unfolds as follows:
{s, s1, . . . , sn} ← CRSS.Share(−, t, n).
Run gx, {x1, . . . , xn} ← SS.Share(−, t, n). Pick
H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → G to be a cryptographic
hash function that maps random strings in G.
Pick a random t − 1-degree polynomial Y with
coefficients in Zq , such that Y (0) = 0, and denote
yi = Y (i). The secret is set to s = gx while each
share is set to si = (xi, yi).
di,j ← CRSS.Delegate(si, Uj).
Parse si = (xi, yi) and output di,j = gxiH(Uj)yi .
s′ ← CRSS.Combine({di1,j1 , . . . , dil,jl}).
Run s′ ← SS.Combine({di1,j1 , . . . , dil,jl}) and
output s′.
Correctness
If l ≥ t, then CRSS.Combine({di1,j , . . . , dil,j}) outputs
s′ =
p=l∏
p=1
(
dip,jp
)λip
=
p=l∏
p=1
(gxiH(Uj)
yi)
λip
= g
∑p=l
p=1 λipxipH(Uj)
∑p=l
p=1 λipyip
= gkH(Uj)
0
= gk
= s.
Security
The security of CRSS is based on the fact that, in the ran-
dom oracle model, delegations for different identities cannot
be combined to remove the blinding factor from the secret.
Assuming that H(·) is modeled as a random oracle and that
the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G, we can show
that any p.p.t. algorithm A has only negligible advantage in
winning Game Priv*. We provide details of the proof in
Appendix C.
E. Commune: Protocol Specifications
Recall that Commune leverages a shared repository, which
is an abstraction of the owners’ storage space on S. The shared
repository uses a versioning system so that content cannot be
overwritten but only new content can be added. In particular,
Commune optimizes performance by splitting a file in smaller
units, and encoding/decoding each unit separately. Therefore,
when a new file version is written to the shared repository, the
writer only needs to upload the units that have changed from
the previous version.
Files written to the repository are encoded in tokens and
distributed across the owners’ accounts. Leveraging the basic
ACLs of S, owners exert their individual policy on the tokens
they store on their accounts. The distributed enforcement of the
SOM policy is implied by the enforcement of each owner’s
individual policy on his tokens by S.
Encoding must guarantee both correctness and security of
reading operations. Hence, users who are authorized to read at
least t tokens must be able to decode the original file; users
who are granted read access on less than t tokens must not
be able to recover its content. Furthermore, users must not be
able to pool their credentials to escalate their access rights.
Create a File
File creation requires one user, the file creator, to “boot-
strap” the system and write the initial version of the file into
the repository. For this reason, we assume that—at the file
creation time—the file creator has been granted the right to
write new data to each of the owner’s accounts on S.
The file creator first divides the file F into k fixed-
sized units. For each unit Fi (i ∈ [1, . . . , k]), he runs
{si, si1, . . . , sin} ← CRSS.Share(−, t, n) to produce a fresh
secret si and n of its shares. Secret si is used as a symmetric
key to encode the unit Fi in n chunks using SFD. That is, the
file creator runs {ci1, . . . , cin} ← SFD.Encode(t, n,Fi, si, λ).
The token of the unit Fi for the owner Oj is set to (cij , sij)
(i.e., one chunk outputted by SFD.Encode(·) and one secret-
share outputted by CRSS.Share(·)). Finally, for each owner
Oj , the file creator writes {(cij , sij)}i∈[1,...,k] to Oj’s account
on S. Each owner, therefore, receives one token for each unit
that constitutes F.
Grant/Deny Write Rights
An owner Oj grants write rights to a user Ul by granting
to Ul the right to write new data (i.e., tokens) to his account.
Similarly, Oj denies write rights to Ul by denying Ul the right
to write new data to his account.
Update a File
Assume Ul wants to write a new version of a file F.
For simplicity, assume that the new version differs from the
previous one by only one unit Fi (the case where the old and
the new versions differ in several units is handled in a similar
fashion).
At this point, some owners may allow Ul to write tokens
to their accounts while others may not. Let O+ be the subset
of owners who grant to Ul write rights to their accounts.
Similarly, let O− be the subset of owners who deny to Ul
write rights to their accounts. Ul can, therefore, only distribute
tokens to owners in O+. This scenario is equivalent to the case
where Ul distributes tokens to all owners in O, but the ones
in O− decide to reject the version produced by Ul and make
the received tokens unavailable.
Ul is an authorized writer and his version accepted (i.e.,
considered as written to the shared repository) if and only if
|O+| ≥ t. In this case, there are at least t tokens for the
new unit, so it may be decoded by users who collect enough
credentials. If |O+| < t, user Ul is not authorized to write and
his version is rejected (i.e., considered as not written to the
repository), since there are not enough tokens to successfully
decode the unit produced by Ul.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F3 F4 F5
F1 F2 F3
F2 F3 F4
Version 1
Version 2
Version 3
Version 4
File F
Fig. 3. Reading a file in Commune. To read version x of a file, a reader
must fetch the latest endorsed tokens created up to (and including) version
x, for each unit that comprises the file. The figure shows a file that spans
5 units (depicted as boxes) and has 4 versions. Reading version 4 requires
fetching (a) tokens that encode units that are new in this version, (b) tokens
that encode F1 created at version 3, and (c) tokens that encode F5 created at
version 2. All of these tokens are shown with tick borders.
Grant/Deny Read Rights
Recall that for each unit Fi, an owner Oj receives the
token (cij , sij). Oj can grant to Ul read access to that unit by
endorsing the token for Ul and granting to Ul read access
on the endorsed token. Token endorsement requires Oj to
run dij,l ← CRSS.Delegate(sij , Ul). The endorsed token
(cij , dij,l) is then made available by Oj for Ul to read. If a file
consists of multiple units, Oj must endorse all relative tokens
for Ul and grant to Ul read access on all endorsed tokens.
Oj can revoke read rights that were previously granted, by
denying to Ul the right to read the previously endorsed tokens.
File Reading
If the original file spans several units, Ul must decode each
unit separately in order to read the entire file. That is, for each
unit, he uses the set of endorsed tokens fetched to recover
the secret key via CRSS.Combine(·) and then uses the secret
key to decode the unit via SFD.Decode(·). Note that for an
authorized reader to read version x of file F, he must fetch the
latest endorsed tokens created up to (and including) version
x, for each unit that comprises the file. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Assume the user Ul is granted read access to
{(cij1 , dij1,l), . . . , (cijt , dijt,l)}. To access unit Fi,
he runs si ← CRSS.Combine({dij1,l, . . . , dijt,l})
to recover secret key si and then runs Fi ←
SFD.Decode(si, {cij1 , . . . , cijt}, λ). Uj proceeds in a
similar way in order to recover all units of F that he has
access to.
Security analysis
From Sections III-C and III-D, it follows that given t tokens
of a file unit Fi, endorsed for a unique user identity, it is
possible to recover both the secret key used to encode Fi
and its AON-FFT ciphertext, so that the original file can be
decrypted. That is, honest readers can access files written by
honest writers, if they are granted such right by at least t out
of n owners.
Property 1 (cf. Section III-B) is fulfilled as follows. First,
Commune uses copy-on-write to prevent writers from over-
writing content in the shared repository with garbage. Second,
malicious writers (i.e., writers who have been granted write
access by fewer than t owners) are unable to distribute a file
without honest readers detecting it. In other words, a file is
considered as written if and only if it is correctly encoded in
tokens and those tokens are distributed to and endorsed by at
least t out of n owners. Any content distributed through other
means (out of band channels, the writer’s account on S, etc.)
is easily recognized as malicious by honest readers. We argue
that the detection is the only solution for protecting honest
readers, because there are no mechanisms to deter malicious
writers from disseminating any content (cf. Observation 3).
We also stress that honest readers can easily detect writers
that distribute polluted (i.e., non-decodable) tokens. Denial-
of-service attacks, therefore, are out of our scope.
Property 2 is satisfied by combining CRSS and SFD.
The former ensures that coalitions of users, where no single
user has enough tokens endorsed for his identity, pool their
endorsed tokens in order to escalate their access rights. The
latter addresses the case where at a time τ1 a user has access
to t or more endorsed tokens of a file unit Fi, but at a time
τ2 > τ1, his access rights are revoked. That is, at the time
τ2, the user has access to fewer than t endorsed tokens. SFD
ensures that even if, at the time τ1 the user may have cached
the key used to encode Fi in tokens, he will not be able at the
time τ2 to decode parts of Fi. Note that, once a user has access
to the file, then he can locally store any plaintext content of
his choice. Similar to other access control schemes, Commune
cannot deter this behavior.
Finally, given the guarantees that Commune makes for en-
forcing the write and read actions, it follows that Commune
is a (correct) solution for distributed enforcement of the SOM
access control policy (see Definition 1).
IV. PROTOTYPE DESIGN & EVALUATION
To evaluate Commune, we implement a prototype inte-
grated with Amazon S3 [1]. In this section, we describe the
implementation and evaluate its performance.
A. Implementation Setup
We leverage Amazon S3 to instantiate S: for each user
in U , we create personal accounts in Amazon S3, into which
users can upload content and define arbitrary access control
policies. In our implementation, we use Amazon S3 access
control features to distribute tokens from the file creator to the
set of owners O ⊆ U . In particular, we assume that each
user sets up (i) one “temporary” folder where other peers
are granted write access, and (ii) one “main” folder where
endorsed tokens are stored and retrieved. When the file creator
wants to distribute a token to owner Oj , he writes the token to
Oj’s temporary folder. Since no other user apart from Oj has
read access to the temporary folder, the new token is protected
from unauthorized access. At this point, Oj can endorse the
token for any other user, say Ul, store the endorsed token in
his main folder and grant read access rights on the endorsed
token to Ul.
Parameter Default Value
w 128 B
t 4
n 10
|Fi| 10 MiB
TABLE II. DEFAULT PARAMETER VALUES USED THROUGHOUT THE
EVALUATION.
Our prototype, implemented in Java, is a multi-threaded
client-side interface to repositories hosted on Amazon S3. The
client runs on a user’s machine and uploads/downloads content
to/from the repositories. For evaluation, we use Ubuntu v. 12.04
on a machine running Intel Core i5-2400 (at 3.10 GHz), where
up to 4 GB of RAM are allocated to the OpenJDK VM.
The implementation of SFD leverages Rijndael [15] (im-
plemented using the Bouncy Castle Java library [4]) as
the underlying block cipher for AON-FFT and systematic
Reed-Solomon codes [27] (implemented using the Jerasure
library [2], [20]) for information dispersal. We chose a symbol
size of 16 bytes, and a security parameter λ = 128 bits.
Our implementation of CRSS leverages the secretsharejava
library [3] with a 386-bit modulus.
To optimize performance, our prototype handles file unit
operations at a smaller granularity, called pieces. During the
creation of any file unit, the unit is split into pieces that are
processed in parallel. A token for each unit contains one output
chunk of SFD for each piece that composes the unit. The
piece size w is chosen such that tλ|w, where λ is the security
parameter and t is the required reconstruction threshold. This
condition ensures that (i) a piece can be encrypted in an integer
number of ciphertext blocks of λ bits, (ii) an encrypted piece
can be divided into an integer number of input chunks for the
Reed-Solomon encoder, and (iii) the size of each chunk of the
Reed-Solomon encoder/decoder is at least λ bits.
B. Evaluating Single Unit Write/Read
We evaluate the performance of Commune for a single
file unit write and read, with respect to (i) the piece size w,
(ii) the reconstruction threshold t, (iii) the number of owners
n, and (iv) the size of a file unit |Fi|. For that purpose, we
assume the default parameter values shown in Table II.5 We
then change one variable at a time, to assess its impact on
the system performance. For each configuration, we measure
the time required (i) to create and upload a unit Fi, denoted
by Unit Write in our plots, and (ii) to retrieve Fi, denoted by
Unit Read. These times are measured from the initiation of the
operation until the output is available either in the repositories
(for unit write) or on a local disk (for unit read). During
the experiments, we controlled for the effect of caching by
uploading random binary streams at each run.
During Unit Read, our client fetches endorsed tokens from
t randomly chosen owners (who granted read access right
on their endorsed tokens). Recall that a (t, n) systematic
erasure code outputs t data chunks and n − t parity chunks.
5Since our SFD scheme requires that the number of plaintext blocks input
to AON-FFT is a power of 2, we also set w, λ, and t to be powers of 2, in
order to ensure that tλ|w.
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Fig. 4. Performance evaluation of our prototype implementation. The system parameters were chosen from Table II. Each data point in these plots is averaged
over 20 independent measurements; where appropriate, we also provide the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Since data chunks need not be processed at decoding time,
our implementation therefore accounts for the average-case
scenario where the probability that a retrieved token contains
a data chunk is bounded by t/n.
Note that we do not evaluate the time required to grant
read rights (i.e., the time required to endorse a token), since
it does not depend on any of the considered parameters.
Our results are depicted in Figure 4. Each data point in
our plots is averaged over 20 runs; where appropriate, we also
provide the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. For better
analysis, we also monitor the runtime incurred in intermediate
steps for a number of configurations; our results are illustrated
in Figure 5.
Our findings show that writing a new unit (Unit Write) is
less expensive than reading it (Unit Read). We speculate that
the bottleneck for read operations is due to the unique file
descriptor that multiple parallel threads share when writing
decoded pieces to local disk.
Impact of the Piece Size
Figure 4(a) shows the impact of the piece size w on the
performance of Commune. Smaller w leads to a smaller
number of input blocks to the AON-FFT scheme, which
results in better performance. Recall that AON-FFT requires
log2m rounds of encryption over all the m input blocks.
However, we experience higher latencies for very small values
of w, especially in the Unit Read operation. This is due to the
overhead incurred by different threads that must synchronize
on the single file descriptor in order to write data to disk.
Throughout the rest of the evaluation, we set w =
128 bytes, since it shows to be a good trade-off between
AON-FFT performance and disk latency.
Impact of the Reconstruction Threshold
Figure 4(b) shows the impact of the reconstruction thresh-
old t on the system’s performance. As t decreases, the chunk
size of the Reed-Solomon encoder increases; this results in
larger chunk upload and download times. Figure 5 also shows
that a smaller value of t results in longer encoding and
decoding times. On the one hand, during Unit Write, small
values of t result in larger encoding overhead since the size of
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Fig. 5. Runtime analysis for five different configurations of our prototype implementation. The label “writeback” denotes the operation of writing the data
back on disk onto the file descriptor (during Unit Read). Each data point is averaged over 20 different measurements.
the encoding matrix considerably increases. On the other hand,
during Unit Read, small values of t decrease the probability
of recovering data chunks (w.r.t. the probability of recovering
parity chunks), which makes decoding slower (cf. Figure 5).
Impact of the Number of Owners
Figure 4(c) shows that latency increases for both Unit Write
and Unit Read as the number of owners grows. During Unit
Write, this increase is because the file creator must distribute
tokens to more peers. Latency increase during Unit Read is
due to the overhead of the Reed-Solomon decoder, which must
decode parity chunks. As mentioned earlier, the Reed-Solomon
encoder outputs t data chunks and n − t parity chunks. Data
chunks do not need decoding while parity chunks need to be
decoded and increase the decoder overhead. As n grows, the
number of parity chunks increases, and so does the probability
of fetching one of them. As the number of fetched parity
chunks increases, decoding becomes slower.
Impact of the Unit Size
Figure 4(d) shows Commune’s performance for different
unit sizes. In particular, we vary the number of pieces, that
comprise a file unit. Our results show that the time required to
write/read units in Commune increases almost linearly with
the unit size. (Note that Figure 4(d) uses semi-logarithmic
axes.) The time required to read a 10 MB unit in our imple-
mentation is roughly 4.47 seconds. In this case, the effective
throughput of our prototype is close to 18 Mbps.
To optimize the performance, the choice of the unit size
should depend on the user update patterns. Larger unit sizes
mean that users have to upload larger amounts of data when
updating any part of the file. Smaller unit sizes result in smaller
upload times for small updates; small unit sizes, however, incur
considerable overhead when a user updates significant parts of
the file (i.e., when the update affects a large number of units).
In Section IV-C, we study the performance of writing and
reading multiple units.
Peak Throughput (Mbps)
Write 43.39
Read 29.52
TABLE III. PEAK THROUGHPUT EXHIBITED BY OUR
IMPLEMENTATION. WE ASSUME THE DEFAULT PARAMETERS IN TABLE II.
EACH DATA POINT IS AVERAGED OVER 20 DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS.
C. Multiple units
After analyzing the performance of writing/reading a single
file unit in Commune, we now proceed to assess the perfor-
mance of writing/reading multiple units of a given file. This
corresponds to the typical case where a user writes/reads a file
comprised of multiple units, or updates multiple units of the
file.
For that purpose, we measure the peak throughput exhibited
by our prototype implementation. This is achieved as follows.
Given the default parameters (cf. Table II), we increase the
number of units that are concurrently written/read to/from
Amazon S3 until the throughput is saturated. We then compute
the peak throughput as the maximum aggregated amount of
data (in bits) that can be written/read per second to/from
Amazon S3. Our results (cf. Table III) show that the peak
throughput is above 29 Mbps for both write and read opera-
tions.
In summary, we conclude that Commune’s overhead can
be well tolerated in user-driven (i.e., highly interactive) scenar-
ios where users author files and upload/download content to the
cloud. We further point out that in a practical use case, users
bear the full cost of file write/read only once. Since Commune
supports versioning, once a user has uploaded/downloaded the
entire file, subsequent updates can be made to individual units
in order to maximize the performance of the scheme.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss further insights with respect to
the design of Commune.
Transparency to Users
As explained earlier, Commune enables users to coordi-
nate access control to online content in a distributed manner.
We stress that all the operations in Commune are imple-
mented by the client application described in Section IV. Users
need not “manually” distribute or fetch tokens. In fact, users
are only required to set the list of owners for the files they
create and to define the access policy on the files for which
they are appointed as owners.
Changing threshold t
To maintain consistency in Commune, we do not support
the change of threshold t for any file F. More specifically, if an
owner wants to change the threshold, say from t to t′, he must
compute and distribute new tokens to all owners in O. That is,
all owners in O must replace their older tokens with the newly
received ones. However, since each user has full rights on the
tokens he handles, there is no mechanism to force all owners to
accept these changes, and replace their tokens. This can lead to
an inconsistent state in which some tokens correspond to one
file version (with threshold t), while other tokens correspond
to another version (with threshold t′). This is why Commune
does not support changing the threshold.
Adding/Revoking Owners
Our model assumes that the set of owners O is defined
before file creation. Adding an owner in Commune requires
that either the original file creator or at least t out of the
n owners to provide the new owner with his set of tokens.
However, revoking ownership rights from an owner, say Oj ,
may not be feasible since tokens cannot be removed from Oj’s
storage on S without his consent. One possible solution would
be to re-encode the file and distribute new tokens to owners
in O\{Oj}. Nevertheless, similar to the case of changing the
threshold t, some of the owners in O \ {Oj} may decide to
discard the new tokens and keep the old ones—leading to an
inconsistent state.
Fine-Grained Per-Version Access Control
Commune enables owners to perform per-version access
control. That is, owner Oj can, for example, grant to Ul read
access to version x of a file F and deny to the same user
access to version x′ of the same file. This can be useful in
collaborative scenarios where some versions of a given file
may contain information only intended for a subset of the users
(e.g., due to IPR protection).
Note that, due to versioning, a given unit may span several
versions of file F. For example, Figure 3 shows that version 3
and 4 share the same unit F1. Nevertheless, this is transparent
to the user who only decides whether to grant/deny access
to a given version x, while tokens are handled by the client
application. In particular granting/denying read access rights
to version x of file F is achieved as follows:
Granting read access to version x
The client endorses and grants read access to
the most recent version of tokens pertaining to
units that have been updated up to (and including)
version x.
Denying read access to version x
The client only denies read access to the tokens
that were only uploaded at the time when version
x was created, and were subsequently updated in
any later version of the file for which Oj wants
Uj to grant access to.
VI. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to (i)
formulate and solve the problem of distributed enforcement
of shared ownership policies. In the following we survey
relevant related work in the areas of information dispersal,
all-or-nothing transformations, and access control.
Secret Sharing and Information Dispersal
Secret sharing schemes [8] allow a dealer to distribute
a secret among a number of shareholders, such that only
authorized subsets of shareholders can reconstruct the secret. In
threshold secret sharing schemes [13], [25], the dealer defines
a threshold t and each set of shareholders of cardinality equal
to or greater than t is authorized to reconstruct the secret.
Secret sharing guarantees security (i.e., the secret cannot be
recovered) against a non-authorized subset of shareholders;
however, they incur a high computation/storage cost, which
makes them impractical for sharing large files.
Rabin [21] proposed an information dispersal algorithm
with smaller overhead than the one of [25], however, his
proposal does not provide any security guarantees when a
small number of shares (less than the reconstruction thresh-
old) are available. Krawczyk [16] proposed to combine both
Shamir’s [25] and Rabin’s [21] approaches; in [16] a file is
first encrypted using AES and then dispersed using the scheme
in [21], while the encryption key is shared using the scheme
in [25].
Information dispersal based on erasure codes [27] has been
proven as an effective tool to provide reliability in a number of
cloud-based storage systems [5], [6], [17], [28]. Erasure codes
enable users to distribute their data on a number of servers and
recover it despite some servers failures.
Ramp schemes [9] constitute a trade-off between the se-
curity guarantees of secret sharing and the efficiency of infor-
mation dispersal algorithms. A ramp scheme achieves higher
“code rates” than secret sharing and features two thresholds
t1, t2. At least t2 shares are required to reconstruct the secret
and less than t1 shares provide no information about the secret;
a number of shares between t1 and t2 leak “some” information.
All or Nothing Transformations All-or-nothing transforma-
tions (AONTs) were first introduced in [23] and later investi-
gated in [11], [14]. The majority of AONTs leverage a secret
key that is embedded in the output blocks. Once all output
blocks are available, the key can be recovered and single blocks
can be reverted.
Rivest [23] also mentioned a transformation that is inspired
by Fast Fourier Transform. Van Dijk et al. [26] later on
leveraged Rivest’s transformation to construct a “proof of
encryption” of files in the cloud. In this paper, we extend the
use of Rivest’s transformation to construct an AONT scheme,
AON-FFT, that supports the distributed enforcement of shared
ownership in the cloud.
Resch et al. [22] combine AONT and information dispersal
to provide both fault-tolerance (i.e., decoding requires only
t out of n shares) and data secrecy (i.e., confidentiality is
guaranteed w.r.t. parties that collect less than t shares), in
the context of distributed storage systems. In [22], however,
an adversary who caches the encryption key can still decode
single shares.
Access Control Systems
Current state-of-the-art access control systems—such as
SecPAL [7], KeyNote [10], and Delegation Logic [19]—can in
principle express t out of n policies. These languages, however,
rely on the presence of a centralized PDP component to evalu-
ate their policies. Furthermore, their PDPs cannot be deployed
within a third-party cloud platform. As explained in Section II,
these access control systems rely on an administrator to define
and modify access control policies. In our setting, this means
that a set of owners has to elect one enforcer who has unilateral
powers over their files.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though existing cloud platforms are used as collab-
orative platforms, they surprisingly do not support any notion
of shared ownership. We consider this to be a severe limitation
because collaborators cannot jointly decide how their resources
are used. The problem of enforcing shared ownership in the
cloud is even more difficult since a cloud platform does not
allow deployment of a third-party enforcement component.
In this paper, we introduced a novel concept of shared
ownership and we described it through a formal access control
model, called SOM. We also proposed our scheme, Com-
mune, that distributively enforces SOM. Commune can be
used in existing clouds without requiring any modifications to
the platforms. We implemented and evaluated the performance
of our solution within Amazon S3. Our results show that
Commune scales well with the file size and with the number
of users.
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APPENDIX
A. Datalog Encoding of the SOM Access Control Policy
To show that SOM can be centrally enforced, we present
its encoding in the Datalog logic-programming language. We
chose Datalog because it is the basis for implementing most
of the existing credential-based access control systems (e.g.,
Trust Management systems such as SecPAL [7], DL [19], etc.).
We represent a file system state as a Datalog database [12]
that has a set of relations describing each file’s owners and
its threshold. The SOM access control policy is represented
as a set of Datalog rules (clauses). We translate requests and
credentials into Datalog clauses, which are then evaluated over
the current state together with the SOM policy.
We first give a brief overview of Datalog (see [12] for
a more extensive survey). A Datalog program is a finite
set of clauses of the form: S ← L1, . . . , Ln , where
S and Li are function-free first-order literals of the form
predicate(arg1, . . . , argn). We refer to S as the head of the
clause, and to Li as a body literal. We adopt the following
notation: a variable starts with the ? character, a constant starts
with a capital letter, and a predicate name starts with a lower-
case letter. A clause with no body literals is called a fact.
All clauses are safe: all variables that appear in a head literal
also appear in at least one body literal. A Datalog program
can be split into two sets of clauses: EDB and IDB. EDB
is a set of facts whose head literals do not appear as head
literals in any other clause. All other clauses are in the IDB
set. Intuitively, we think of an EDB as an input for computing
all implied facts by the clauses in the IDB set. The declarative
semantics of a Datalog program interpret each clause as a
first-order sentence: ∀x¯L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Li → S, and take a whole
program to be a conjunction of its clauses. For each program
P = IDB∪EDB, let σ(IDB,EDB) = {atom | I(P) |= atom},
where I(P) is the first-order translation of P , and |= is the
logical implication.
A SOM state s is a tuple (Files,Users,Owns,Thresholds)
where Files denotes a set of strings representing file names,
Users is a set of users, Owns is a subset of 2Users×Files, and
Thresholds is a mapping from Files into N. For a state s, we
define a set EDBs containing all ground atoms: file(File),
user(User), owns(User,File), and threshold(File, N). A re-
quest r is a tuple (R, C), where R is a request credential
submitted by a user, and C is a set of available credentials.
Credentials can be either submitted by a user, or kept in a
separate storage and appended to each request. Given a request,
T (C) generates the following set of Datalog rules IDBr:
T (O says U can actionOp(F)) = says(O,U, actionOp, F )
The translation of R is similar, except that we do not
generate says facts but Datalog queries:
T (U reqs actionOp(F) = can(U, actionOp, F )
The set As is a set of Datalog rules parameterized on s,
that enforces the shared ownership:
can(?U, actionOp, ?F )← file(?F ), user(?U),
threshold(?F, ?T ),
[[says(?O1, ?U, actionOp, ?F ), . . . ,
says(?O?T , ?U, actionOp, F ),
owns(?O1, ?F ), . . . , owns(?OT , ?F ),
?O1 6=?O2, . . . , ?O1 6=?O?T , . . . , ?O?T−1 6=?O?T ]]
Intuitively, the given rule is a template rule that instantiates
the necessary clauses for all actionOp operations. The variable
?T denotes a threshold, and ?U denotes a user. The reason
for doing so is to correctly enforce the current (for the given
state s) threshold t for a particular file. In short, we need to
generate the correct number of ?Oi variables for each file and
its threshold in s. To represent this dynamic part of a clause
(that is dynamically adjusted for each state), we enclose it
within [[ and ]] brackets.
Finally, given a SOM state s, and a request (R, C), we say
that SOM’s Datalog-based Policy Decision Point (PDP) grants
R if and only if: I(EDBs ∪ As ∪ T (C)) |= T (R).
B. Security Analysis of SFD
We treat the information dispersal encoder of
SFD.Encode(·) as a ramp scheme [9]. In particular, to
maximize the code rate, we assume a (0, t, n)-ramp scheme,
with t as reconstruction threshold and 0 as privacy threshold6.
Let F¯ denote the input to the information dispersal encoder.
Hence, at least t chunks are necessary to reconstruct F¯ ;
however, each single chunk leaks some information about
F¯ . More specifically, if the adversary A is given l out of
n chunks outputted by SFD.Encode(t, n, F,K, λ), then the
following holds:
H(F¯ |A) =
{
l
tH(F¯ ) if l < t
0 if l ≥ t
where H(·) denotes the entropy.
Since F¯ is the output of AONT (which, is essentially a
block cipher) we can assume H(F¯ ) = mλ.
Therefore, if A is given l = t− 1 chunks, the uncertainty
on F¯ is reduced by a factor of t; that is, H(F¯ |A) = mt λ.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that when m = t
and given t − 1 SFD encoded chunks, A can decode all but
one block of the AONT output.
Hence, we are left to show that, given K and
f¯i1 , . . . , f¯im−1 , A has negligible advantage in recovering
f ⊆ F , i.e., a substring of F of size λ. We start noting
that the security of the underlying block-cipher prevents the
adversary from recovering partial bits of any cleartext block.
That is, the adversary can only learn entire blocks of cleartext.
Therefore, we focus our analysis on an adversary that tries
to recover any cleartext block fi ∈ F . Furthermore, in our
definition the adversary is not allowed to store any blocks of
ciphertext/cleartext nor is she allowed to store any intermediate
block produced by AON-FFT. Indeed, we argue that if a
rationale adversary were to store any block of data, then she
would store blocks of cleartext (i.e., the actual file) in order
to easily access it despite revocation. No security mechanism
can cater for effective revocation if the adversary has a local
copy of the protected resource.
We prove the security of AON-FFT by induction. Let
AON-FFT(4) be the graph that defines the operations of
AON-FFT when m = 4. Clearly, recovering any input block
of AON-FFT(4) requires all 4 output blocks. Recall that each
output block is λ-bit in size and has high-entropy (since it
is the output of a block-cipher). Therefore, given all but one
output block, A has only negligible advantage in guessing the
missing block and recovering any input block.
6This means that any single chunk leaks information about the encoded
input.
Similarly, an AON-FFT(8) graph has two AON-FFT(4)
subgraphs (one left and one right), plus an additional round
of encryption. Recovering any input block of AON-FFT(8)
requires one input blocks of each of the two AON-FFT(4)
subgraphs which, in turn, require all their output blocks. There-
fore, recovering any input block of AON-FFT(8) requires all 8
output blocks. By iterating this analysis for larger graph sizes,
we can easily prove that for any m, recovering any input block
of AON-FFT(2m) requires all 2m output blocks.
C. Security Analysis of CRSS
We now prove the security of our CRSS scheme (Sec-
tion III-D). More specifically, we show that a p.p.t. algorithm
A that has non-negligible advantage in winning Game Priv*
defined in Section III-D, can be used by p.p.t. algorithm B as
an internal routine to break the security of the threshold secret
sharing scheme by Charnes et al. [13].
That is, on one side B is challenged by a challenger C
to find the secret gx given only t − 1 shares as output by
gx, {x1, . . . , xn} ← SS.Share(−, t, n). On the other side, B
challenges A to break the security of CRSS.
Simulation starts with A who submits two messages x0, x1 of
equal length. Those are forwarded by B to C that flips an un-
biased coin b and secret-shares xb. Given our particular secret
sharing scheme, we assume that the secret to be reconstructed
is gxb . At this time, B also picks a random t−1 polynomial Y ,
such that Y (0) = 0 and computes yi = Y (i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
During Type-1 queries, A submits indexes i1, . . . , it′ . B
forwards them to C that replies with {xi1 , . . . , xit′}. B then
sends to A shares {si1 , . . . , sit′} where sil = (xil , yil), for
1 ≤ l ≤ t′.
Similarity, during a Type-2 queryA submits a fresh identity
Uj and t′′ indexes i′1, . . . , i
′
t′′ . For each identity Uj , B picks at
random hj ∈ Zq and sets H(Uj) = ghj . If an index i′l has been
submitted during type-1 query, B knows xi′l and can compute
the delegation di′l,j = g
x
i′l
H(Uj)
yi′
l . Otherwise, B asks C for
share xi′l and computes the corresponding delegation.
Note that A can submit a Type-2 query if only if t′ < t−1.
Therefore B can still ask C for the missing shares. During the
guess stage, A will output his guess b′ and B will use it as its
own guess towards C.
Since H(·) is a random oracle and A has a non-negligible
advantage in guessing b, then B has the same advantage in
breaking the security of [13], thus concluding our analysis.
